



# Bridges in Germany

Columbus hadn't been born yet, in Rome the Pope was Honorius II and the Emperor Barbarossa was still a young man - but there was already the "Stone Bridge" over the Danube at Regensburg.

It was built in the first half of the 11th century and was regarded at that time as a "technical marvel", 310 metres in length with 16 stone arches. Today it is the oldest stone bridge still in use.

The bridges in Old Germany do not merely cross rivers and streams; they also span centuries and epochs. The ancient bridge across the Main in Würzburg is over 500 years old, with its stone figures of the Twelve Apostles, Mary and Joseph. The timber bridge across the Rhine in the romantic township of Säckingen was built 400 years ago. It is a gem - the oldest extant timber bridge in Europe. The stone bridge

In the Renaissance town of Frickstadt on the North Sea coast was erected shortly after 1600. The modern Köhlbrand Bridge in Hamburg is of almost gigantic proportions. Suspended on cables it is four kilometres long and 63 metres high. Germany is truly a land of bridges.



Bridge in Würzburg

Köhlbrand Bridge in Hamburg

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## EEC leaders fail in bid to solve farm, cash issues

Frankfurter Rundschau

tween industrial progress or the agricultural policy status quo between now and the next summit in terms of EEC funds.

The Foreign Ministers of the Ten are unlikely to succeed before Christmas (or, for that matter, in January) in arriving at an overall compromise the London summit failed to reach on what EEC Commission president Gaston Thorn of Luxembourg has termed the second-generation European Community.

So decisions cannot be expected to be taken until the next EEC summit in spring. By then the next round of farm price rises will have been agreed by the Agriculture Ministers.

This will mean, as the 10 heads of government cannot fail to have realised, the loss of a further year in which agricultural policy might have been reformed.

M. Thorn expressly pointed out this danger. He and the Brussels Commission provided, with their partly specific, partly somewhat vague proposals, the basic direction of preparations for the London summit by the standing committee of EEC ambassadors and the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Incidentally, no Common Market summit had ever before been as meticulously prepared as this one.

Given its failure one may wonder what point there is in the three summits

a year for EEC heads of government on which agreement was reached in 1974. The European Community head of government who has been in office longest, Bonn's Helmut Schmidt, feels a regular exchange of view three times a year is of incalculable value. Public opinion would do well to stop expecting Euro-summits to achieve major results. Yet the Bonn government has just launched Foreign Minister Genscher's bid for progress towards a European Union, and he envisages the European Council or summit meeting of the 10 heads of government, emerging as the Community's centre of political decision. Ever since three summits a year have been held, EEC Council of Ministers in all departments have taken to shelving basic disputes for consideration by the European Council.

The Euro-summit then re-entrusts the



Hamburg briefing

The head of the American negotiating team in Geneva, Paul Nitze had talks in Germany before going on to Switzerland. Here he takes a break with the Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, and his wife, Loli, at their Hamburg home.

(Photo: dpa)

Councils of Ministers with finding a solution (which was exactly what happened at the London summit).

If the summit is truly to emerge as the decision-maker on fundamental issues, a Euro-summit such as the Lancaster House gathering would need to be held over four days rather than two. But that would make expectations even greater and failures to reach agreement would have even more far-reaching psychological consequences.

The London summit was not really a failure, or will not have been one if the 10 EEC leaders were to reach a political decision to ensure that compromise formulas were found at forthcoming meetings of the Council of Ministers.

A fundamental prerequisite for the success of the European Community is that everyone must be equally dissatisfied with every step forward but that no-one must be a loser.

That is why Anglo-German dreams of a Common Agricultural Policy almost free of charge (something not to be found in any modern industrialised country) are just as unrealistic as other EEC countries' hopes of being able to live better before long by virtue of Germany's contribution to the Common Market's kitty.

Nowhere is there more truth in the adage that politics is heavy going than in efforts to promote Western European integration. So let us be patient!

Erich Hauser

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 30 November 1981)

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
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(Cartoon: Kiesel/Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland)



## ■ SOCIETY

Therapy instead of jail  
basis of new drug law

The new Narcotics Act comes into force in the New Year. It was intended to make life easier for drug addicts, but in practice it is another matter.

Andrea, 26, was firmly resolved to break his heroin addiction. He spent more than 18 months trying to arrange for a place at a Salem clinic.

It was hard work because there are not many places available. But he made telephone calls, wrote letters, had an interview, paid the clinic several visits and did not let matters rest.

On 20 September 1981 he made it. After being associated with narcotics since the age of 13 and twice having been put on cold turkey by the courts he finally gained admission to a long-term therapy course.

But it was all over in little more than a fortnight. Four plain-clothed police officers arrived with a warrant and took him back to investigative custody in Göttersloh.

He stood accused in Göttersloh of having cannabis resin and heroin in his possession and of dealing in them.

Chief public prosecutor Hanse in Bielefeld says the decision to arrest him was taken after careful consideration. He admits that it was, perhaps, a borderline case and certainly somewhat unusual.

The Salem clinic says it was purely and simply a scandal.

At first glance this case might appear to have been an unfortunate mishap, but on closer scrutiny it may not, says Bonn lawyer Rüdiger Böhm, be the rule, but it is by no means uncommon.

Herr Böhm specialises in defending people accused of narcotics offences.

Two similar cases were mentioned in one month to Alexander Eberth, a Munich lawyer who heads the Drugs and Narcotics Association, which helps to coordinate the activities of 30 organisations that help addicts.

In one of the two cases a patient was arrested and taken into investigative custody after he had already undergone therapy for six months.

It is hard to say how often the heavy hand of the law descends in this way. Not even the Addiction Association in Darmstadt keeps figures on the subject; it is not prepared to hazard a guess either.

In practice they are kept under wraps and quietly dealt with by the legal authorities, lawyers and local government departments.

Staff at the Salem therapy centre are more explicit. Their clinic has been in existence for the past nine years. It is based on anthroposophical principles and has an excellent reputation.

They say the case initially mentioned is in clear contradiction of the therapy-not-imprisonment formula on which the new Narcotics Act is based.

The Act does not come into force until the New Year, but this principle has been part and parcel of practical treatment of drug cases for some time.

People who work with drug addicts have mixed feelings about the Act. They range from misgivings to anxiety.

Heinrich Breuer, head of the Cologne centre for social therapy, reckons the politicians have scored a king-sized own goal this time.

Alexander Eberth in Munich is less

upset. "It's no great shakes," he says, "but we could have had a better one."

Criticism is first levelled at the term "a not inconsiderable quantity." People caught in possession of this quantity of narcotics will be liable to not less than two years' imprisonment.

Whatever the term means, experts are convinced it means a change for the worse. "A not inconsiderable quantity," the courts currently rule, is for instance more than 1.6 grams of heroin.

Yet a heroin addict who deals in the drug to earn his own daily shot has to mix and sell between six and 10 grams of heroin to get together a gram for himself.

Addicts have few ways in which they can hope to finance their addiction. They can deal, break in at chemists or go in for felony of other kinds.

"Most of the addicts who peddle drugs for a living will no longer come within the scope of the Act," says Herr Breuer.

Therapy not imprisonment will apply to those who face less than two years in gaol, whereas the dealer just described will stand to be sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

But the courts already have wide powers of discretion, and the Act does not necessarily reduce the leeway that is the bench's privilege.

There have been times when possession of a quarter of a gram of heroin have been enough to put an addict behind bars for three years.

Yet on another occasion an offender in possession of 50 grams of heroin has got away with a 10-month sentence.

The new Act pays no attention to a demand social workers have made for years. It is that an addict ought not to face punishment for getting hold of narcotics for his own use.

But the Act makes no distinction between an addict who buys his own and a peddler who earns a living from the addiction others suffer from.

Herr Eberth agrees with the general criticism and feels the lawmakers would have done well to include in the new Act a declaration of intent.

What he has in mind is a declaration that would provide judges with a basis for drawing a distinction between the addict and the drug peddler.

The third point that has come in for criticism is that no distinction is drawn between hard and soft drugs. A teenager who buys marijuana or cannabis resin for himself and his friends can easily have 20 grams on his hands.

This is clearly a "not inconsiderable quantity" and the offender will be punished on the strength of criteria that also apply to hard drugs such as heroin or opium.

The outcome is that the hypothetical teenager stands no likelihood of undergoing therapy either. He too will be sent straight to gaol.

"But it is important to draw a distinction," says Herr Breuer. "First, hashish is easy to come by. Second, children and young people do not feel they are doing something illegal."

"They will soup up a moped without feeling they are doing something wrong and smoke a joint with an equally easy conscience — rather than getting drunk."

Herr Eberth does not see this omission as a serious problem. He says case law has already made a clear distinction between hard and soft drugs.

Drug advice centres see tough problems ahead for them. They are something of an anomaly as it is, seen as suspicious by society and as suspicious by virtue of representing society by the addict.

Their status has been rendered even odder by the new Act. "Persons or institutions treating addicts," it reads, "will notify the legal authorities whenever therapy is abandoned."

Therapists argue that this requirement makes them deputies to the law enforcement agencies. Besides, abandonment of a course of treatment can be the fault of the centre that provides the treatment.

This point is made by Herr Breuer, but the law as it will shortly stand rules that addicts who abandon therapy are liable to serve any prison sentences that might be outstanding.

In the past advice centres have been able to reassure suspicious clients that they work anonymously, notifying neither the police nor the courts.

This argument is now unlikely to be believed, many therapists are afraid. They feel their work will be made more

Continued on page 15

People facing a slow and painful death from nuclear fallout should be provided with some means of committing suicide, says a German group which favours humane death.

The *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Humanes Sterben* makes this demand in an open letter to Bonn Interior Minister Gerhart Baum, whose department is responsible for civil defence, and to the Interior Ministers of the *Länder*.

It says the country is prepared neither for a reactor catastrophe nor for a nuclear war, and even if the best precautions were taken it would be utopian to expect health services to be maintained for tens of millions of people.

If an atomic bomb were to fall on, say, Hamburg there would be between 200,000 and 300,000 serious fallout victims competing for a mere 30 hospital beds specially equipped to handle people with severe burns, and the 30 beds were scattered all over the country.

There ought at the very least to be 250 beds, the group says.

A civil defence brochure for which

Suicide aid for  
fallout  
victims sought

Herr Baum wrote a preface to said to be ludicrous. It suggests aluminium-clad foil is a suitable shield to protect people from the nuclear heat wave.

Civil defence units should be equipped with suicide pills instead. This was essential from the viewpoints of both common sense and humanity.

The group, which has been in existence for just over a year and claims to have about 1,000 members, feels its most important accomplishment so far has been to draw up a last will and testament for patients.

On a variety of printed forms patients can state in advance what they would like to be done if they were in a condition verging on the hopeless in which they were unable to explain what they wanted.

Alcohol costs  
more in human  
and cash terms

Last year people in the Federal Republic of Germany spent nearly DM 59.3bn on alcohol and tobacco. This was roughly DM 900m more than in 1979.

Taxes of one kind and another counted for about DM 17bn of this total. Alcohol, says an addiction centre in Hamm, Westphalia, is the most significant addictive drug in the country.

Every man, woman and child in Germany downed 12.67 litres of pure alcohol in 1980, or slightly less than in 1979 per capita intake of 12.74 litres.

Even so, that still means a statistically monthly average of 1.06 litres of alcohol, or about 30 grams a day.

Spending on alcoholic drinks totalled DM 39.1bn, which was an increase of DM 100m on the previous year.

There have been no major remarks in drinking habits. Beer drinking, for instance, remained steady at 14 litres per head a year (as against 14.5 in 1979).

Wine consumption has increased, however, from 333.2 million bottles in 1979 to 358.8 million bottles last year. The tax claw-back from spending on alcoholic drinks totalled a hefty DM 5.7bn.

There are an estimated 1.5m to 2m alcoholics, with women making up 10 per cent and juveniles and young people about 10 per cent of the total.

The cost of medical treatment for alcoholics is steadily increasing. Last year the health insurance schemes paid about 14,000 people to be sent to hospital to dry out.

This treatment cost approximately DM 280m.

Smoking is on the increase too. The number of cigarettes that went up in smoke last year was up from 12bn to over 12.8bn.

It cost the smokers about DM 20.2bn of which the taxman retained DM 11.3bn or so. Statistically speaking, per capita consumption of cigarettes over the year was 2,085.

There are also an estimated 600,000 heroin addicts in the country. Drug offences increased from 51,435 in 1979 to 62,395 in 1980.

(Köln: Stadt Anzeiger, 7 November 1981)

They could either call for no medical aid despite references to persons or efforts to be spared or for life-sustaining drugs or treatment to be stopped when as far as could reasonably be said, they were on the point of death.

Members of the group hope in this way to decide, in appropriate circumstances, of their own free will when they are to die: by refusing further medical assistance.

In another open letter to the parliamentary party leaders in the Bonn Bundestag the group calls for a Bill to amend Paragraph 216 of the criminal code.

The amendment it has in mind would entitle everyone to both active and passive help to die if they so wished without obliging any member of the medical profession to lend a hand.

"We are not a suicide movement," the letter states. But if death might be a relief and the doctor was not able to provide it, people should be entitled to decide for themselves.

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 7 November 1981)

Borders are no obstacle to  
the hired killer

But she also told the conference that her office was successful in hampering the work of these gangs and in bringing some of the smaller organisations to book.

The objective of organised crime, to make the biggest profit in the shortest time, calls for thorough "market research".

Cash, diamonds and precious metals are the easiest commodities to deal with.

Dealers in stolen cars and arms (the cars are usually expensive and stolen on order) require highly trained staff.

Frau Werner also told about specialising in the theft of meat.

The public prosecutor's report to the conference coincided with the conclusion of experts that there is a close link between the growing number of foreigners in this country — and particularly asylum seekers — and organised crime.

Bonn's commissioner for aliens' affairs, Liselotte Funcke, warned against hasty conclusions, generalisations and

Crime is steadily increasing despite huge efforts at social work, a conference has been told.

Never before had Germany done more in the social sector, said the head of the Hesse criminal investigation branch, Vorbeck.

One speaker said foreigners pushed the crime rate up. They formed only 7.5 per cent of the population but comprised 15 per cent of suspects.

Police, lawyers and other criminal experts from several countries attended the conference, in Wiesbaden.

Delegates agreed that crime in Germany would keep on rising. But they could not say why.

Lower Saxony's Justice Minister, Hans-Dietrich Schwind, who is a professor of criminology, said that we don't even know why a person does not commit a crime, let alone why he does.

One speaker stressed that the possible reason could be upbringing. Today's children needed "moral rearmament."

He also said that schools should teach courtesy, discipline and industriousness.

A federal prosecutor said a great many teachers and university professors should be screened. He doubted their loyalty to the Constitution.

"As long as enemies of the Constitution are permitted to teach, we must not expect sound values to be conveyed," he said.

Bonn Justice Minister Jürgen Schmude disagreed. He was reluctant to go along with the general trend and put the blame on the schools. He stressed the importance of the home, saying that in cases of broken families it was up to the authorities to look after the children.

The minister also called for more effective youth assistance, though conceding that this would be costly.

A sound social policy, he said, was still the best crime prevention.

A police officer pointed out that North American crime statistics showed

over-simplifications that could promote xenophobia.

She pointed to the difficult position of young foreigners in particular — people caught between widely differing cultures.

But the experts remained unimpressed by the possible political consequences and stuck to their pessimistic outlook.

According to Frau Werner, there are no Mafia-type gangs in this country — as yet. This is due to the fact that we do not have the class differences between rich and poor that have driven whole sections of southern Italy's population into crime.

But there was a danger, she said, that the growing number of asylum seekers could create a new sub-proletariat. Due to these asylum seekers — especially those who come for economic reasons — Germany is in fact an immigration country.

Growing unemployment and diminishing economic opportunity make the huge mass of underprivileged foreigners — especially in the cities — a dangerous compost heap for organised crime.

There are more and more indications that foreign syndicates are spreading to

Hunt for social  
answers  
'a failure'

that spending money on youth work did not pay.

Vorbeck argued along the same lines, saying that never before had Germany done more in the social sector and yet the number of crimes has been rising steadily.

There are three to four times as many juvenile foreigners below the age of 18 involved in crimes of violence (robbery, murder and rape) than Germans in the same age group.

Frankfurt Public Prosecutor Adelheid Werner told the meeting that Germany has so far been spared organised crime syndicates along the lines of the Mafia; but there are signs that this type of crime is spreading to this country. It appears that organised gangs operating abroad are establishing strongholds in Germany.

There is hardly a trick professional criminals don't know, she said. Pimps have even found ways and means of bringing Latin American prostitutes to Frankfurt.

They first fly the girls to Italy, where they arrange for them to marry ancient men in old folk's homes. This made them automatically Italian citizens with all the privileges of the European Community, including freedom to work in any Community country.

Police officers said foreigners are not deported after they have committed a serious crime.

Justice Minister Schmude rebutted this, pointing to cases where foreigners were deported because they were found twice driving without a licence.

One of the main points of criticism by



Adelheid Werner... 'sign that organised syndicates are organising.'

this country, establishing strongholds and seeking out victims.

Police officers are overtaxed and are calling for political solutions.

But the police experts, whose minds are riveted on individual cases, tend to overlook the fact that the vast majority of the foreigners among us are decent and law-abiding.

The Wiesbaden conference was emphatic in calling for an integration of our foreigners as a sort of patent cure. But nobody was able to say how this was to be achieved.

Stefan Geiger  
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 11 November 1981)

police officers was the growing violence in connection with demonstrations.

Günter Ermisch of the Bonn Interior Ministry said that the public had grown used to dangerous conditions to the point where such crimes as arson receive no public attention.

In fact, violence is no longer seen as abnormal. On the contrary, many people consider themselves entitled to commit such acts because they know no other way of attracting attention.

Another speaker summed this up, saying: "Democracy is a form of government in which those who scream loudest get their way."

Ermisch said that the fact that the activities of left wing groupings led to counter-measures by their opponents entailed a serious danger to public safety.

Such militia-like groupings must not be underestimated, and the state's power monopoly must be upheld for the sake of peace. Any compromise here would be dangerous.

Lower Saxony's Justice Minister Schwind called for preventive measures, for instance through social workers at police stations.

Once the law has been broken, the penalties must be stiff to increase the risk to the criminal.

Herr Schwind said: "If Herr Schmude and I were to plan a burglary, we would not think of the penalty but only of getting caught."

Though the meeting dealt with its stocktaking and forecasts with the earnestness such a subject deserves, there was also some levity.

When Frankfurt's public prosecutor complained that the use of housing in the city's railway station district for prostitution was treated as a misdemeanor, saying "... after all, we all know the brothers are there," the audience laughed uproariously, but nobody contradicted her.

Alfred Bahr  
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 13 November 1981)



## ■ WORLD AFFAIRS

## Brezhnev in Bonn: attempt to build bridges

The Soviet leaders' talks in Bonn were overshadowed by the superpowers' Geneva talks on medium-range missiles, which began a few days later.

They served as a preliminary to the Geneva talks in two ways: internally as a means by which the two sides could brief each other, outwardly in a bid to influence European public opinion.

European opinion was one of the targets aimed at by President Reagan in his TV broadcast on 18 November. The battle for hearts and minds is in full swing.

The meetings between Mr Brezhnev and Herr Schmidt were, along with the consultations between Foreign Ministers Gromyko and Genscher, the last East-West talks before the superpowers conferred in Geneva.

They were a last opportunity of discussing the Geneva disarmament agenda at the highest level beforehand, an opportunity of making direct declarations of political intent.

For one last time each side's objectives, be they a zero option or a moratorium, could be fully contrasted in the full spotlight of world attention.

Experts and delegations would then get down to detailed negotiations and thus vanish from the full glare of international publicity for the time being.

Both sides in Bonn made great play with the advantage they alone enjoy in the complex context of East-West ties: continuity of both political and personal relations.

Helmut Schmidt and Hans-Dietrich Genscher have been in office for 12 years in Bonn, for the past seven as Chancellor and Foreign Minister respectively.

Except for Canada's Mr Trudeau, who has not held office throughout, they are the oldest foreign policy hands NATO has.

They and the Soviet leaders are, in each other's eyes, what both hold to be particularly important: they are predictable.

Ties between Bonn and Moscow are thus the exact opposite of what Soviet-US ties, marked by ill-will and suspicion, have been for some time.

There is not a NATO country to match the Federal Republic for its close ties with the Soviet Union at all levels of communication.

This autumn's visitors to Moscow have included Willy Brandt, Heinz-Oskar Vetter, the trade union leader, and Johannes Rau, the Premier of North Rhine-Westphalia.

They are leading West German public figures by any yardstick. Other politicians to have sounded out the lie of the land in Moscow include Bundestag MPs Egon Bahr and Walther Leisler Kiep.

This is no way alters the fact that Moscow's main adversary and partner is Washington and that, from the Soviet point of view, ties with the Americans have not really been satisfactory since 1974, when Dr Kissinger left the State Department.

Chancellor Schmidt himself has not always felt US foreign policy over the past four or five years to be right, or let us say, convincing.

He is certainly a statesman whose view of the situation is bound at least to interest the Soviet Union.

His explanation of President Reagan's

zero solution offensive may well have proved useful to the Soviet leaders.

When one bears in mind that the Chancellor is bound to have learnt more behind closed doors about Mr Brezhnev's latest variation on his moratorium offer than the Soviet leader disclosed in public, this alone will have made the Bonn talks worthwhile.

Both sides need to know whether the other plans to be flexible in Geneva and if so, in what respect.

The Soviet tenet of approximate parity as of 30 November 1981 is a maximum stand taken with Geneva in mind. So is the zero solution envisaged by the US government.

The current American version of the zero option is that all Soviet SS-20 missiles must be scrapped if NATO missile modernisation plans are to be shelved.

Herr Schmidt has already stated in public, regardless of Bonn's official acclaim for Mr Reagan's talk of a zero option, that the two sides need to come a little closer.

In his after-dinner speech in Bonn the Chancellor gave an interesting indication of what he may have in mind. He recalled that he had warned the Soviet leaders of the consequences of their missile modernisation since 1978.

Soviet missile modernisation, he had said, was bound to lead to NATO replying in kind, as indeed it has done.

Might this be taken to mean that the number of SS-20s deployed at the beginning of 1978 (less than 100, as against today's 250-odd, each with three warheads) could be considered a reasonable offer by the Soviet Union?

Could a return to this particular status quo be considered sufficient to justify this missile modernisation by NATO?

This is reported to be the idea at the back of the Chancellor's mind in Bonn today; not only Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr are thinking along these lines.

If this were the case (and there are reasonable arguments in its favour), the exchange of views between Bonn and Washington would need to be greatly intensified.

Helmut Schmidt certainly does not doubt for a moment that when decisions are reached in Geneva he will have played his part.

His talks with the Soviet leaders went well, especially as the Kremlin was caught off balance in its European publicity offensive by President Reagan's decision to push a peace policy on similar terms.

The zero option certainly put the Soviet Union on to the defensive in the media. There was no way in which a revamped moratorium proposal could change this.


Moscow will have to come up with something new in its bid to curry favour with European public opinion, especially with the peace movement.

The propaganda counter-offensive that will probably be launched is that old standby a nuclear-free Europe, the super-zero option, as it were.

In view of the Soviet Union's conventional superiority this alone cannot be enough. But there need be no limit to the imagination of the two sides at Geneva.


Werner A. Perger

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 29 November 1981)



(Cartoon: Hans/Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland)

## Strauss sounds out opinion in China and Japan



Bavaria's Prime Minister and CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss returned from a visit to Tokyo and Peking as the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev began his visit to Bonn.

In all likelihood, the issues Chancellor Schmidt discussed with Brezhnev were also a major topic of Strauss' talks in the Far East: the Soviet threat resulting from the buildup of medium range missiles; the NATO buildup to counter the threat; and concern over the preservation of peace.

The fact that Brezhnev's visit coincided with Strauss's Far East trip could have been pure chance — but it could not have been better timed.

The CSU leader met with great interest in the German view of East-West developments. This gave him the chance to elaborate on the German position.

Even though Strauss and Schmidt occasionally lash out at each other for the benefit of the electorate, they see eye-to-eye on most issues, particularly on the need to boost defences unless negotiation results make this redundant.

Schmidt's talks with Brezhnev and the Strauss' trip to the Far East thus both served national interests.

Strauss is perfectly cast in his role. His acumen in matters of security and international politics is highly regarded or at least respected abroad.

In Tokyo, four English-language newspapers even went so far as to speak of him as the German opposition leader.

In Peking, he was received as *Leo Peng-You* (good old friend).

Deng Xiaoping, deputy chairman of China's Communist Party and the man who actually wields the power, continuously spoke of the fact that Strauss and he had predicted the current developments as far back as 1975. He said that there was no need to review their assessment of Soviet policy.

And now the two politicians are again agreed. As they see it, the 1980s are shaping up as the critical decade of the century. Peace can only be preserved if

Europe, China and Japan fully meet their security responsibilities. Though the Soviet Union is not at present contemplating a war, Moscow's arms buildup, proceeding at speed to enable the Soviet Union to win any possible armed conflict, is a major threat.

The politicians Strauss talked to stressed that Japan's relationship with Peking had never been so good as the past 2,000 years and emphasized that this is the best guarantor of stability in the Far East.

In Peking, Strauss was told that the aim of a normalisation of relations between Moscow and Peking was to enable one superpower to counter the other with a destructive force in case of an attack on its territory.

Soviet-Chinese border disputes will remain unsettled as long as the Soviet Union persisted with its policy of expansionism, imperialism and hegemony.

Peking recommended that the West take a tough stance in bargaining with Moscow because only thus could tensions be wrung from the Soviets.

Strauss hopes that he will have helped by his trip to bring about no waves in the attitude towards the Soviets, but that the West will be less tense about the disarmament talks with Moscow while retaining its defence potential.

Schmidt's trip to the Far East thus both served national interests. Strauss is perfectly cast in his role. His acumen in matters of security and international politics is highly regarded or at least respected abroad.

(Nordwest-Zeitung, 25 November 1981)

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## DISARMAMENT

## Geneva meeting unfolds chessboard of missile deployment

Geneva disarmament talks on intermediate-range missiles are dealing with a complicated numbers game. The missiles themselves are nuclear warheads with a considerable destructive potential, among them the Soviet SS 20 with a range of 4,000km and warheads apiece, making for a total destruction potential of 150 times of the conventional explosive

American atom bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945, killing 140,000 people, had the explosive power of 15 kilotons of TNT. An SS 20 is thus ten times as destructive as the Hiroshima bomb.

Intermediate range weapons are differentiated from others to be either shorter or longer and this is where the difficulties

undisputed that the intercontinental missiles (ICBMs), which are fired at the USA from the Soviet Union and vice versa, are long-range weapons. They include the American Minuteman (range about 8,000km; explosive power 1,000 kilotons) and the Soviet SS 9 (range just under 9,000km; explosive power 500 kilotons each).

Agreement between the two superpowers limits the number of these long range weapons. But below this there is a grey zone which — the argument: intermediate range

missiles enable one superpower to counter the other with a destructive force in case of an attack on its territory. The same objective can also be achieved with intermediate range weapons, though their range is shorter it is enough to permit their use for strategic purposes.

They consist of direct participants, or countries whose troops are stationed in central Europe, and indirect participants, whose territory adjoins the force reduction zone, on the extent of which prior agreement was reached.

The zone comprises the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR, the Benelux countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The aim of the MBFR talks is to reduce troop strength in the region so as to achieve numerical parity of land and air forces.

The current round of talks began in September and will last until Christmas. No-one expects substantial progress, but appearances are deceptive.

All that is needed is pressure on the political trigger for the two sides to go ahead with the first stage of troop cuts in central Europe.

Plans have been negotiated by the various delegations and are ready to be implemented whenever the word is given. Delegates hope it may be given by a conference for which preparations are being made in Madrid.

At the Helsinki review conference in the Spanish capital plans are being drawn up for an all-European conference on confidence-building measures.

The data discussion is the issue that is hampering progress on troop cuts in Vienna. The two pacts have exchanged

information, for instance, land-based intermediate range missiles; there are those that can be fired from a submarine platform and there are others that can be launched from an aircraft.

They also differ concerning the type of weapons, range, flying time, accuracy, explosive power, and scores of other

parameters. A comparison of the respec-

## Kölnischer Stadt-Anzeiger

the December 1975 Nato decision in order to counter the threat posed by the Soviet SS 20s.

Brezhnev, on the other hand, during his visit to Bonn proposed a freezing of the current intermediate range missiles on both sides. This means that Nato would not be permitted to boost its European defence while the Geneva talks are in progress.

Brezhnev tried to make this old proposal, which the West has repeatedly rejected, more palatable by agreeing to withdraw a "certain part" of Moscow's intermediate range missiles if Washington agrees to the freeze.

The Soviet leader spoke of a reduction "to the tune of hundreds rather than dozens of units in this category."

The positions of the superpowers are irreconcilable because they base their calculations of balance on different premises.

According to Brezhnev, the West has 996 medium range systems in Europe while the East only has 975. But this contention is open to question — if for no other reason because, as far back as 1978, Brezhnev already said that a balance had been achieved and yet Mos-

cow continued its arms buildup unabated.

In the Western view, on the other hand, the Soviets have achieved a dangerous supremacy as a result of their SS 20s. Bonn Government Spokesman Kurt Becker spoke of a ratio of three or four to one.

Neither of the two sides will make concessions without raising demands. It is therefore likely that the Geneva talks will soon range further afield than just the Soviet SS 20s and the American Cruise missiles and Pershing 2s.

The Soviet Union said some time ago that mutual balanced arms reductions must also include the forward-based systems; in other words, above all America's 700 aircraft carrying nuclear devices that are stationed in Western Europe and aboard carriers in the Mediterranean.

In addition, Moscow also British and French nuclear weapons as part of the West's intermediate range potential.

Before the West agrees to expand the range of the Geneva talks to include these issues it will probably insist that additional Soviet weapons also be included. These additional weapons could encompass such bombers as the Backfire, Badger and Blinder.

It therefore seems inevitable that the Geneva talks, like other negotiations before them, will bog down in disputes over definitions and details and so obscure the real problem: the dangerous threat which both sides pose to the world by their ceaseless arms buildup.

Hans Werner Kettenbach

(Kölnischer Stadt-Anzeiger, 27 November 1981)

## The troop-cut talks march on and on

data on the number of troops they have stationed in the reduction area.

Nato says it has 991,000 men under arms in the countries concerned. The Warsaw Pact claims to have 980,000 troops in its sector of central Europe.

But the West says the Eastern Bloc has 180,000 soldiers and airmen than it will admit to, and delegates have for several years sought in vain to clarify the terms of reference.

Many observers feel this dispute is mere shadow boxing. It is hard to say who is stalling. Nato has certainly called on the Warsaw Pact to be more open on military matters.

The East rejects this demand, claiming that the West merely wants to gain prior access to details of Warsaw Pact organisation.

Since 1979 Nato has submitted a package consisting of eight proposals it would like to see go hand in hand with troop cuts.

They relate to verification and to ensuring that Soviet troops withdrawn from central Europe are not simply transferred to Nato's northern or southern flanks.

But the Warsaw Pact rejects any idea of inspection or observation of military movements at transit points. So progress is now awaited from Madrid, where views seem to be heading towards rapprochement.

The Soviet Union would be willing, at the Madrid talks, to extend confidence-building measures to the United States provided the West extended its counter-offer to include supply routes across the Atlantic.

Confidence-building measures are, for instance, the exchange of manoeuvre ob-

serves and prior notification of troop movements.

At Vienna the two sides are agreed in principle to start sending home US and Soviet forces from central Europe, with the United States being required to withdraw an initial 13,000 and the Soviet Union 30,000 men.

It remains to be seen whether 20,000 Soviet troops and their tanks have left the GDR, as Moscow and East Berlin claim.

In the second stage of troop cuts domestic forces would be reduced to 700,000 soldiers and 200,000 airmen on each side.

Stage Two is due to start three years after the reduction of foreign troops begins, and the Soviet Union has called for a commitment to ensure that troop cuts are continued beyond the first stage.

Nato's proposal is for a reversion provision by which Stage One could be rescinded if no headway were made on Stage Two.

Agreement has been reached on so many other details that agreement on troop ceilings on either side of the East-West border in Europe seems a definite possibility.

Who would stand to benefit more from a troop cut agreement? The answer is, definitely, the West, because the Warsaw Pact would have to reduce some of its current conventional superiority.

The West would be relieved of their fear that the East Bloc armed forces might be in a position to invade and occupy Western Europe from a standing start, as it were.

Soviet troops in any number could only be deployed in neighbouring countries after a breach of the MBFR agreement. This would ensure the West of a much longer early warning.

But the geographical fact of life that US reinforcements would need to be flown 3,000 miles across the Atlantic, whereas Soviet reinforcements would

Continued on page 5



## Please stand up the real Jürgen Möllemann

Bundestag member Jürgen Möllemann (FDP) is a phenomenon. The man-in-the-street knows the image produced by political public relations rather than the man.

The Möllemann phenomenon is evidenced by the many small and large headlines he makes and the flurry of activities and excitement his name causes in editorial offices.

It is hard to shed the suspicion that the newsmen have succumbed to the effective half-truth of the communications expert Marshall McLuhan to the effect that "the medium is the message."

The medium of politics is publicity — and exactly this, publicity, is Möllemann's most important message.

This being so, the Möllemann phenomenon is the most consistent and almost ingenious development of the traditional understanding of the term "politician" to the limits of absurdity.

There is, of course, also a politician by the name of Möllemann who is vaguely connected with the phenomenon of the same name.

The man Möllemann joined the CDU at the age of 17. In 1970, he turned his back on the Christian Democrats and joined the Free Democrats.

But a couple of weeks ago he once more turned to the CDU when, together with Matthias Wissmann (chairman of the *Junge Union*, the CDU's young members' branch), he called for a demonstration on the eve of Brezhnev's visit to Bonn to protest against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Was he returning to his political roots? Was he becoming a convert?

As with many others in the coalition, the chairman of the FDP Bundestag Work Group for Foreign, Intra-German and Security Policy has shifted his emphasis from détente to security policy. Yet he is anything but an indiscriminate cold warrior. Incidentally, the human rights pathos — which, where the CDU is concerned, grows naturally from the very roots of the conservative party — sounds a bit thin with Möllemann.

Naturally, Möllemann did not act against his genuine convictions when he called for the demonstration and urged his fellow-MPs to sign an Afghanistan resolution.

After all, he also considered it right to charter an aircraft to trail a banner reading "And who is demonstrating in Moscow?" during the 10 October peace rally in Bonn.

But the PR phenomenon Möllemann permits no conclusions regarding the fascinating story of the fighting politician Möllemann — a man of convictions who faces the public after a long struggle within himself. The phenomenon is always bigger than the person and his convictions.

The person, by the way, is by no means unimpressive. Nobody in the FDP has ever denied his intelligence and industriousness. And there is no match for him when it comes to campaigning and debating.

It was Möllemann who — almost single-handedly — did away with a white spot on the FDP's political map: defence and security policy.

In fact, he was instrumental in drafting the FDP's parliamentary work pro-

gramme on security — and there is no narrow-minded militarism in it.

When it comes to internal Bundeswehr matters, Möllemann is both a respected and feared discussion partner who has been rubbing Defence Minister Hans Apel the wrong way, not only through his incisiveness but also through his intimate familiarity with the issues involved.

Whenever Möllemann returns from one of his many visits abroad, it is invariably worthwhile having a chat with him — not only because he is a master in gaining access to interesting and important people but also because he knows how to analyse his experience and has a nose for political developments.

For instance: despite his agreeing with the American security concept in principle, he was quick to discover operational mistakes in the blueprint.

He is certainly not dogmatic, and he frequently shocks orthodox experts by his off the cuff way of voicing ideas. For example: "How about a bit of division of labour for Nato? The nuclear part of the operation for the Americans and the conventional one for the Europeans."

In political debates within the party, he wields a keen blade, mostly defending the positions of FDP right wingers.

His speeches in the Bundestag are well structured, slightly conservative and they usually back the government's view. Möllemann is a respectable MP of above average standing. But then, there must be about 100 such MPs in the Bonn parliament and none has ever received the same public attention.

There are many reasons for this. Möllemann has an eye for the unorthodox and provocative novelty. He was the first Bonn MP to visit North Korea. He had

a two-and-a-half hour private conversation with Cuba's Fidel Castro. (How he arranged it will remain his and Castro's secret.)

He has for years been in touch with PLO leader Arafat, the man most of his fellow-MPs in the West assiduously tried to steer clear of.

Parachutist Möllemann has always enjoyed making his jump over unknown and dangerous territory. And he knows that such a jump is always news worth a headline, regardless whether favourable or unfavourable.

Möllemann is always up front. In the spring of 1978, when the neutron bomb was one of the hottest topics, he had already publicly decided to endorse it while his fellow party members in the Bundestag were still wondering whether to take a stand on this issue at all.

He had publicly backed arms exports to Saudi Arabia long before his party got down to discussing the issue, eventually deciding on delaying tactics — not least because it was upset by Möllemann attempt to make it endorse papers he had already prepared.

For a while Möllemann probably also benefited from the fact that, as his bosom enemy Burkhard Hirsch once put it, he acted as Genscher's ventriloquist.

In any event, the impression was that Möllemann voiced what the party chairman thought but was loath to put into words.

The formula at the Foreign Office now is: we have been informed but Möllemann is travelling on his own initiative and responsibility.

It is pretty safe to assume that Möllemann has at times considered himself Genscher's test pilot and that he hoped to be appointed Minister of State at the Foreign Office.

But the party chairman himself has never publicly acknowledged this role on the part of Möllemann and there is nothing to indicate that Genscher ever wanted to foist him on the Foreign Office.

As to the demonstration on the eve of Brezhnev's visit, here he certainly failed

Walter Hallstein has turned 80. Few people today know that he was one of the most important politicians of Germany's and Europe's post-war history and that he was a lucky dip for the new German state.

It was Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who brought the professor of law to Bonn. He needed an expert on the Schuman Plan for the integration of the coal and steel industries of six European countries which was to mark the beginning of a new European policy.

Hallstein was appointed state secretary at the Chancellery (1950-51) and state secretary at the Foreign Office (1951-1958).


He then became the first president of the European Commission in Brussels (1958-67).

He was instrumental in the difficult task of getting a new country off the ground and integrating the Federal Republic of Germany in the new European and Atlantic order. Hallstein (CDU) was a member of the Bundestag from 1969 to 1972.

Even for his fellow MPs he was something of a historic figure. For his admirers, however, he was above all the "great European".

Hallstein had no shortage of enemies who themselves were men of political stature. The most prominent of them was General de Gaulle. Yet the two respected each other.

## The indelible Hallstein mark



Walter Hallstein... has turned 80.

De Gaulle viewed Hallstein's European policy as totally wrong, too legally-bound and not "national" enough.

Hallstein unfolded his views on how European politics should be conducted



Jürgen Möllemann... publicly in a message.

(Photos: Stra...)  
...had said it, she might have... to the tail end of a prison... not just to her last years at... woman serving a "life sen-... work said she would appreciate... her workmates. More leeway... she wanted.

Whenever newsmen are after a... vocative statement they know where... look for it.

Yet it is not so much his statements... that cause the headlines. The notori-... secret Middle East plan that was... cised after Möllemann's first meet-... with Arafat was essentially the pro-... of journalistic mistakes and expecta-... What happened was that Möllemann... image took over.

This is not surprising. Even the... client Greek Epictetus knew that... not facts but views about facts that... vern our affairs."

Incidentally, this very sentence was... be found in a letter which a Munich... vertising agency (in which Möllemann... has a stake) circulated among its cli-

It would have been interesting to... Möllemann about this coincidence, if... this was impossible because he had... ready left the country to discuss Mid-... East affairs with the PLO and Libya... Gaddafi.

Rolf Zundel  
(Die Zeit, 20 November 1981)

in a number of great speeches that... subsequently published in book form.  
It is not generally known that the... signed Hallstein Doctrine was not of... his brainchild. It was above all faith... by Professor Grewe.

Hallstein politically upheld this po-... as a state secretary.

In essence, the Hallstein Doctrine... putated that any diplomatic recogniti-... of the GDR by another country was... be viewed as an unfriendly act to-... the Federal Republic of Germany... all the consequences. This entailed... cluding the breaking of diplomatic re-... tions.

Hallstein used the doctrine as an... strument that could be replaced... another one when it was no longer u-... ful.

Surrounded by his art collection, Wa-... Hallstein now lives in Stuttgart with... friends in the neighbourhood care... him.

No matter what becomes of Europe... politics, Hallstein's mark will remain... indelible.

He will continue to serve as a... stick for his successors at the Europ-... Commission and for European states-

He has greatly contributed to... converting European law into Europ-... policy and towards integrating the... Still, much remains to be done.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-... für Deutschland, 17 November 1981)

## People opt for early retirement as pension schemes hit hard times

Early or Work Longer? " were... options up for discussion at a... held by the Protestant Church... in Bad Boll, near Stuttgart.

...enthusiasm turned out to be very... as early retirement. No-one... interested in working longer... (among them was a choice).

...53 I counted each passing... participant said. "Five to go, ... two, one, and then the... When it finally came I first... had until nine every morning."

...she said it, she might have... to the tail end of a prison... not just to her last years at... woman serving a "life sen-... work said she would appreciate... her workmates. More leeway... she wanted.

...would like to be able to say she... feeling too well and wouldn't be... that morning.

...about the conference who... such as older workers, older un-... disability and old-age pensio-... exclusively with early retire-...

Retirement was 20 years away as far... as he was concerned. What worried him... was what was going to happen after he... had completed his one-year training... course.

People are tending to opt for early re-... tirement in various ways at a time when... the pension schemes have run into... financial difficulties.

...people who took part were clearly

concerned exclusively with early retire-... ment. "Women can retire at 60," one... said, "why not men?"

Other arguments were that the war-... time generation was at a disadvantage, ... having undergone more wear and tear in... the course of a hard working life.

And: "I'm too young for a pension... but too old to be still working." These... were some of the views collected and... chalked on the blackboard.

No-one had written: "I would like to... work longer."

One reason why this option was neg-... lected what that more than a quarter of... the people taking part were older work-... ers who were unemployed and hardly in... a position to choose between early re-... tirement and carrying on working.

A 54-year-old man who had worked... long years as a furniture packer said: ... "Now I have a bad back no-one would... have me in any case." A former miner... who was being retrained as a printer... wrote on the board: "What will happen... afterwards?" And he didn't mean after... retirement.

Retirement was 20 years away as far... as he was concerned. What worried him... was what was going to happen after he... had completed his one-year training... course.

People are tending to opt for early re-... tirement in various ways at a time when... the pension schemes have run into... financial difficulties.

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for health reasons to put in more than... 20 hours work a week there is at least a... possibility of bridging the gap between... unemployment benefit and old-age pen-... sion.

The labour exchange assesses benefit... entitlement in terms of job availability, ... whereas the pension scheme assesses... early pension applications in terms of... health.

But a 1976 ruling of the Federal Wel-... fare Court says that pension awards... must take into consideration not only... the applicant's health but also the job... situation.

In practice, labour exchange records... are also consulted by the pension... schemes, while people who stand no... chance of finding a new job are paid... unemployment benefit until they qualify... for pensions (or the pension scheme re-... jects their application).

Frau Dr Kohlless of the Stuttgart wel-... fare court reminded the conference that... rulings must bear in mind that the... community as a whole had to foot the... bill and that pension schemes were not... charities.

At this point an old-age pensioner... came up with a striking idea. Must help... always be provided by the state or by... some institution or other, he asked.

Might not individuals who were earn-... ing good money be prepared to sponsor... particularly needy unemployed persons?

In his home town he had advertised... in the local paper for people to sponsor... a woman in distressed circumstances. ... There had been plenty of offers to pay... her telephone bill and help out with... other extras.

There should also be more part-time... jobs. In Sweden one job in five was a... part-time job; in Germany only one in... thirteen.

Civil servants, who could not, in any... case, be sacked in other than exceptional... circumstances (and were thus in a... secure position) should be required to... contribute in some way towards unem-... ployment insurance.

Old-age pensions should be available... for all at 60. Companies that axe jobs by... rationalising should be taxed accordingly.

These were some of the ideas put... forward by Dr Tegmeier of the Bonn... Labour Ministry. He made it clear that... the pension schemes have little leeway, ... since pensions had to be paid from con-... tributions.

But with a little more imagination... and readiness to rethink, labour and... incomes could be redistributed in a... more humane manner.

Isolde Neldlein

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 20 November 1981)

## Troop-cut talks

Continued from page 3  
...need only to march a few hundred... miles, cannot be refuted.

Mutual balanced force reduction was... appropriately, a Western idea, prompted... by the June 1968 Nato conference in... Reykjavik.

The West later made its agreement to... the holding of the Helsinki Conference... on Security and Cooperation in Europe... subject to the East agreeing to hold the... Vienna MBFR talks.

The only clear interest the Soviet... Union had in the Vienna talks was the... possibility it might bring of manpower... cuts in the Bundeswehr.

Moscow has not forgotten this objec-... tive, but it has declined in importance... now. The Soviet Union has agreed on... both sides being entitled to reduce their... troop strengths collectively.

This means that countries are not re-... quired to reduce manpower by equal... percentages, so the pressure on Bonn is... no longer as intense as it used to be.

The Soviet Union has scaled down... what used to be its main demand to a... requirement that no one country is to... be entitled to account for more than 50... per cent of its side's collective troop... strength in Central Europe.

Since Bundeswehr manpower in the... region at 445,000 is a whisker less than... 50 per cent of the collective Nato total... of 900,000, the West already meets this... requirement.

Yet Nato has no current intention of... agreeing to it. It fails to see why Mos-... cow should be entitled to a say in how... the West runs its military affairs.

Pierre Simonisch

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 November 1981)



## ■ TRADE

## Huge gas for pipes deal settled

The "contract of the century" between Soyuz-Gasexport, Moscow, and Ruhrgas AG, Essen, has been finalised; contract of the century because it extends beyond the 20th century and because of the amount of money involved.

Even at today's prices, the contract involving the annual supply to Western Europe of 50bn cubic metres of Soviet natural gas during the whole duration of the deal amounts to almost DM400bn.

This marks a new dimension in the international energy business.

Unlike the three previous gas contracts between Ruhrgas and the Soviet Union, this deal, which took years to negotiate, has caused considerable political controversy.

Its main opponent was President Reagan. He was backed by a number of German Opposition politicians for whom every deal with Moscow amounts to a pact with the devil.

They say this contract will increase the Kremlin's political influence and that, by doubling its share of gas supplies to Germany, Moscow could exert pressure.

In addition, the huge foreign exchange earnings from the mid 1980s would strengthen not only the economic but also the military potential of the Soviet Union.

It is, however, rather curious that these reservations voiced at the Ottawa Summit in July were directed only at Chancellor Schmidt.

Although Ruhrgas is the principal contractor, the contract involves six other countries, France, Belgium, Holland, Austria, Italy and Switzerland.

The 5,000km pipeline that is still to be built and that will link Western Siberia with Europe will pump three-quarters of the gas flowing through it to these other countries leaving Germany with 10.5bn cubic metres, a bit more than a quarter.

Assuming that the Soviets really intend

German-Soviet trade has always had the same handicap: the Soviet Union cannot supply what the Germans need and cannot pay for the German goods it needs.

Trade between the two began rising steadily in the 1950s but remained negligible in relation to Germany's foreign trade volume.

In the mid 1960s, Germany's imports from the Soviet Union amounted to about DM1bn. Exports did not exceed the DM1bn mark until three years later. The Soviet Union's share in this country's overall foreign trade thus remained below one per cent.

It was not until the era of détente that the concept of limited cooperation that had governed German-Soviet trade relations since 1950 was abandoned in favour of normal economic relations in terms of international law, and it was then that German exports to the USSR started growing.

A network of treaties and agreements in the 1970s and the liberalisation of trade relations in their wake made it easier for the Soviet Union to export to this country.

By the same token, German companies, benefiting from the government's promotion and guarantees, were able to

## GAS FOR WESTERN EUROPE



to turn off the tap at some point, they would risk a confrontation with half of Europe.

Those who argue that the gas could be used as a political and economic lever with which to exert pressure completely overlook the Soviet Union's interests.

For one thing, Moscow must itself invest billions of deutschmarks to open up the huge gas deposits in Western Siberia, to lay the pipeline and to develop its own gas grid.

For another, all the money spent on this, much of which will go to German industrial companies, can only result in a profit if the gas actually reaches the European homes. It's a case of no gas, no money.

A brief look at our sources of energy shows that the danger of becoming dependent on the Soviet Union and thus vulnerable to blackmail is minimal.

About two-thirds of the primary en-

ergy used in this country has to be imported — and this is unlikely to change in the future.

As a result, Germany cannot achieve absolute supply safety and will always depend on imports. All this country can do is improve the degree of relative security. And this means diversification both in type and source of energy.

Gas is the third most important energy source and now accounts for 16 per cent, of which Moscow currently provides one-sixth.

And even when, as a result of the new contract, Moscow's supplies 30 per cent, this will still be less than six per cent of total energy needs.

Our dependence on Libyan oil is much greater.

In addition, forgoing this mammoth contract would have set back Bonn's policy of getting away from oil.

Jürgen Klotz  
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 21 November 1981)

## Basic problems in commerce with Soviets

Soviet trade with the West  
1980 figures (imports and exports)  
in \$US billion



develop their business with Moscow.

The preconditions for a boom in trade were thus created. Exports rose by an annual average of more than DM1bn to DM6.9bn between 1970 and 1975, increasing the Soviet Union's share of German exports to three per cent.

But this growth was one-sided. During the same period, the Soviet deficit with the Federal Republic of Germany rose by an average of DM1.5bn a year although the terms of trade shifted in favour of the Soviet Union due to the energy price increases.

To offset this, the Soviets put curbs on German imports, which stagnated until 1980.

The euphoria that marked German-Soviet trade relations in the early 1970s has given way to the realisation that trade between the two does not depend on goodwill alone.

The difficulties are fundamental. The Soviet Union's investment policy (like those of all other countries with centrally controlled economies) largely disregards foreign trade requirements. Central planning calls for the standardisation of products, which makes them unsuitable for Western markets.

Russia would like to sell machinery

Continued on page 7

## Contract goes through despite fears on the march of the robots

## Kieler Nachrichten

Years of making Germany dependent on the Soviet Union have been rekindled by the gas-for-pipes deal that will pump an additional 30 cubic metres of Soviet gas into the country every year.

Up to now, the Soviet Union has been only a few men. Only three per cent (18 per cent of needs). But both will rise consistently once the gas begins to flow.

Ruhrgas AG, Essen, the principal contractor on the German side, is confident that even should the Soviet Union turn off the tap at some point, Germany's gas supplies would not unduly.

Ruhrgas says the deal will mean dependence on Opec oil without making Soviet gas vital for the nation's energy requirements.

It will also reduce the oil bill on the balance of payments.

Germany's current energy requirements essentially rest on three pillars: oil, coal and gas. A fourth comprising nuclear energy, hydroelectric power and wind energy is still being developed.

Close to half of the primary energy used in 1980 (47.6 per cent) was accounted for by oil; not quite one-third (29.8 per cent) by coal; and one-sixth (16.3 per cent) by gas.

Nuclear energy accounted for 10 per cent and all other forms of energy combined for 2.6 per cent.

Some 83 per cent of our gas requirements came from Western Europe. The next decade will see some 30 per cent from domestic sources, 30 per cent from Holland and 16 per cent from the Soviet Union.

Germany's gas business now will increase the share of this fuel to between 18 and 20 per cent in the next decade. This would mean that gas would account for 19 per cent of the country's total energy requirements.

Most of the additional gas is supplied by the Soviet Union, starting from 1984/85 (12bn cubic metres per year). This would increase the Soviet share from the present 18 to 30 per cent by the late 1980s.

The gas, from western Siberia, will be pumped through the Ukraine and Southern Urals, the Ukraine and the region near Orenburg, will be pumped through the East-West pipeline and the European gas grid.

Destination countries are France, Italy and Italy, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, along with Germany.

Starting from 1985/86, an additional 2bn cubic metres is to flow to Germany from the sector of the North Sea.

Nigeria, which is now burning gas that Germany produces, is to supply 8bn a year cubic metres of liquefied gas to the West. Breakdowns were by tanker to western Europe since 1990. Some of it will find its way into Germany.

Other sources: North and South America, Africa, and the Middle East. Breakdowns into the production of supply additional gas, which was the main reason for the dependence of American industry

(Kieler Nachrichten, 21 November 1981)

## The march of the robots on to the factory floor

America developed and used its first industrial robots in the late 1960s.

One of the leaders was the world's highest auto maker, General Motors; and GM's scepticism still has its effect on its German subsidiary, the Adam Opel AG, which wants to proceed cautiously in changing.

But the Japanese, always quick to seize on any kind of technical innovation, imported some of the early American robots at the beginning of the 1970s.

Daimler-Benz and VW also made a point of evaluating the American robots but, in the end, they decided that they were not what they needed.

VW was already highly automated when it still produced the Beetle. But the assembly lines on which a daily 4,200 Beetles were welded together had one major drawback: all they could produce were Beetles.

The moment a new model went into production it took tedious and extremely costly modifications to adjust to the new line.

And the days when an auto maker could make out splendidly on one good model are long over. Today, any automobile maker must be capable of instant adjustment to changing whims of buyers if he is to hold his own against the competition.

The present generation of robots plays a major role here. Like humans they always handle one particular tool, such as a welding machine or a spraygun.

Their steel limbs can be moved much in the same way man moves his. The robot's scope of movement ranges between three and seven different motions.

This is rather primitive considering the fact that man can carry out 32 different arm motions. "It's very difficult to imitate nature," says VW engineer Folker Weissgerber, who is responsible for production planning.

The data bank tells the robot what movement to make when. In the case of the Renault 9 the robots weld 4,200 points in every car body. The big Mercedes of the S class needs 6,000 welds.

Yet these robots can work on different models moving along the same assembly line, even if they follow each other in a totally chaotic sequence.

They do with a perfection no human being can match. They do not make the same thing day in and day out as long as their technical freedom from ailments, as long as they don't ask for a break.

They would be wrong to assume that robots are never wrong. Breakdowns were by the early days some ten per cent. And this still happens when the assembly line abruptly switches from mechanical labour, into the production of the main reasons for the dependence of American industry

shows how limited the Soviet Union's export potential is — and it is on this that the further development of German trade depends.

Though official figures for 1980 show that 65.5 per cent of Soviet exports to Germany consisted of semi-finished products and 22.7 per cent of raw materials, the dominant element in these semi-finished products were oil-based goods.


Finished products accounted for only 9 per cent of Soviet exports compared with 86.8 per cent in Germany's exports to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union therefore tries to make as many barter deals as possible in a bid to improve its export chances.

But this violates the concept of a free economy to the effect that the flow of goods must be governed by prices resulting from supply and demand rather than by contractual deals.

So it is impossible to see right now how the Soviet share in Germany's foreign trade can be increased beyond the present 2.2 per cent.

Gottfried Eggerbauer  
(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 20 November 1981)



They're not bothered about a tea break... robots putting a Mercedes together.  
(Photo: Henning Christoph)

A VW bus can thus be welded immediately after a van or a pickup truck. The data bank tells the robot at the assembly line which part is meant for which vehicle and where the welds are to be made.

But it could well impose an entirely unexpected psychological strain on the human worker if he were to consider himself demoted to a robot's helper, carrying out a few remaining tasks that are too complicated for his mechanical counterpart. This is one of the findings of a study for the Metalworkers Union by a team of Göttingen sociologists.

As VW's Weissgerber sees it: "The workers feel that the robots have detracted from their own position. But the use of robots must also be seen in another light. Mechanisation can also be humanisation."

The head of production at Renault, Bilhanic, says it makes no sense to use robots at random. Instead, they must be fully integrated in the production process.

It is not enough to buy a robot and his programme. Before putting a mechanical man to work, his entire production environment must be thoroughly analysed so that the robot can become an integral part of the work process.

This was one of the reasons why VW decided at an early stage to develop and make its own robots. Renault followed suit and founded a subsidiary for the manufacture of robots.

VW produces about a dozen robots a week. But no special subsidiary has been established for this purpose, probably because VW's robots are for the company's own use.

One man can maintain about a dozen robots. Besides, robots are dependable and have a long life expectancy. Breakdowns in routine work amount to less than one per cent of the working time, says Weissgerber.

But even so, he cannot visualise ghost factories operating with ghost shifts.

Not least due to the wary attitude by the trade unions, VW's production planner considers a 60 per cent quota of robots in one production process as realistic.

This will become reality in a few years and in a growing number of branches of industry.

Union apprehension for the future is not unfounded. Up to now, workers made redundant by robots have been given other jobs within the company, 300 in Hanover.

But finding alternative work will become increasingly difficult.

Dietrich Tasch  
(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 21 November 1981)

Continued page 6



■ PERSPECTIVES

# Moscow's plight: it has nothing the world either wants or needs

Early this year State Secretary Amaya of the Japanese Economic Affairs Ministry said in a published interview that he felt the 80s would mark the beginning of the end of Soviet power.

This is a view Mr Brezhnev may well share. There are good reasons why he might do so.

Even the most level-headed appraisal is sure to conclude that Mr Brezhnev heads an empire the change or even disintegration of which would be welcomed by many and regretted by few.

One almost feels sorry for the Soviet leader. It seems reasonable to assume that the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Bulgarians and Germans in the GDR would not shed a tear if Soviet rule were to end.

In the Third World the decline and fall of the last late colonial empire would be viewed with equanimity, especially as apart from words and weapons it had little more to offer than variations on the theme of dependence.

The gigantic Soviet empire with its potential for unlimited opportunity has failed to find a solution to its continual economic hardships.

Despite heavy debts Moscow has run up in the free world Russia has been unable to make a breakthrough and is unlikely ever to do so.

The Soviet Union is playing no part in the powerful, future-orientated upswing of regions in various parts of the world, especially the Pacific, but also North and South America and Africa.

It is steadily falling back. Having ill-advisedly triggered an arms race, Moscow will find itself increasingly short of breath. This is another race it cannot win once the free world seriously joins in the race, however reluctantly and laboriously.

The Soviet Union is undeniably a great power, but it lacks a foreign policy concept appropriate to this day and age. It no longer has anything to offer the world that the world either wants or needs.

So it is hardly surprising that Moscow gives rise to more fear than hope. The Soviet Union is already being overtaken and outstripped by the major currents of the age.

The main reason why this is the case is probably that a policy of imperialism has grown antediluvian and that the Soviet leaders have not yet summoned the intellectual courage to pursue policies that might make dealings with them more interesting or promising.

A power that behaves as the Soviet Union does, formulating and enforcing such a disgraceful policy as the Brezhnev Doctrine, disregarding the sovereignty of states even beyond the bounds claimed for the Brezhnev Doctrine, practising overt and subversive intervention, refusing the right of self-determination and continually violating human rights, cannot be surprised when its deeds, which stand in stark contrast to its words, no longer carry conviction with anyone who might prove a valuable partner.

Those who fall foul of these blunders will in the long run merit no more than contempt by virtue of their intellectual or moral weakness.

That is what makes them worthless,

indeed dangerous, for Moscow. The Kremlin would do well to stop speculating on our momentary madness.

In Germany no-one who has been responsible for the policy of detente will be able to forget the sad lesson that the Soviet Union embarked on an enormous arms build-up at a time when they were hoping to reap the fruits of detente.

To add insult to injury, Bonn made it easier for Moscow to rearm by offering Moscow generous economic cooperation, including the loans to underwrite it.

Despite well-nigh morbid talk of Soviet intentions and capabilities, the main aim of which seems to be to make us first worried, then pliable, there is something the Soviet Union would be well-advised to bear in mind.

It is that the world as a whole would not be prepared to accept a further accretion of facts accomplished in breach of all standards that govern international law and that a major clash would be bound to end with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is easy enough to understand Mr Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders of his generation. One can even feel the same way they must do when they try to defend the result of the Second World War for as long as humanly possible.

The price of victory in World War II was, for the Soviet Union, 20 million dead. But in power politics there is no such thing as for ever.

If the Soviet Union had only exer-

cised moderation in its claims and implemented them by methods other than those of despotism, the impossibility of its grand design would not have been so swiftly or dramatically apparent.

As matters stand, however, the entire enterprise stands no chance whatever.

Policies must be reviewed, concepts reappraised and methods reconsidered if there is to be any change in the direction of stable conditions and lasting cooperation.

A realisation that history must take its course and a sense of the course it is taking could help the Soviet leaders to find a way out of the problems they face.

The signs are that change is in the offing. Those who would have the Soviet leaders reassured in their mistaken belief that the old approach might once more succeed have only themselves to blame for endangering peace.

Even those who would like to strike a balance on the strength of current circumstances are talking about the past, not the present. Poland is no more than a pointer to the shape of things to come.

As yet the signs being exchanged between Europe, America and the remainder of the non-Communist world are confused and unclear. But the right questions are already being asked on all sides.

The mist is clearing and the outlines

## Ethnic German question won't go away

Views differ on the total number of would-be emigres. Some say they number 10 per cent of the 1.8m-plus Soviet Germans. About 80,000 applications have been registered by the Red Cross; another 20,000 or so are known to want to leave the Soviet Union.

The desire to return to Germany, a country they have never seen, is particularly marked in areas to which Volga Germans were deported at the beginning of the Second World War.

In their new homes in the Far East and North of the Soviet Union, ethnic Germans may, for the most part, be highly rated as hard workers, but they form only small minorities among the local nationalities.

They feel their linguistic and cultural identity is threatened. Most of their children have no longer learnt German, the South German dialect of the Volga Germans; their native language is Russian.

The desire to emigrate is limited only in areas where, as in the Altai region, between eastern Kazakhstan and south-west Siberia, German communities have stayed together for generations.

The Soviet authorities say the decline in numbers of ethnic German emigres over the past few years is because the original demand has gradually been met. In practice the opposite would seem to be the case. Many new arrivals lead to a snowball of further applications for families to be reunited.

of a new view of world affairs no shape.

Discussion of Soviet affairs goes round in circles and is both the and of strictly limited interest to an overwhelming majority of countries.

They have set their sights on the future and feel they face major tasks that call for solutions other than imperialist power politics.

We and our friends in the free world can supply the answers now; the Union cannot do so yet.

We in the Federal Republic of Germany have neither the power nor the size to play any special part in running risks of one kind or another.

It is the Soviet Union that ought to start wondering how to get round its present impasse and to evolve a policy worthy of a world power.

It would need to be a policy such as that for despotism freely chosen and welcomed by all concerned.

Since it would be presumptuous to offer the Kremlin unsolicited advice, it might well be best to leave it to reconsider and to wait and see.

The Soviet Union could have only as a friend and a partner (and not only Germany), but not on the basis of its present policies.

Time is on our side and unless indications are deceptive the Soviet leaders have no time to lose if they belie the gloomy forecasts of what is ahead for them in Asia and elsewhere.

Good of their peoples.

Günther Diehl was the Bonn government's press spokesman under Kurt Georg Kiesinger and last year ambassador in Tokyo.

In reality the frustrated emigrants for the most part victims of world wars. In the early days of detente Soviet authorities suddenly eased restrictions.

The thaw having been followed by a gradual chill, they have recently reverted to more restrictive policies.

The connection is corroborated by almost total standstill of Jewish emigration, which has always allowed ones to be drawn on the state of Soviet-US ties.

This harder line is gradually being applied to other sections of Soviet Jewry.

Last summer even Willy Brandt, the man held in high repute by the West, was no longer able to persuade Soviet authorities to be obliging in the number of cases of hardship.

Mr Brezhnev seemed as willing to help, but Herr Brandt made it clear that was named R 136a. The investigation led German assign policy gestures or presents for statesmen.

They either feel compliments are returned in kind or are generally of the opinion that foreign policy considerations are best dealt with by a domestic outlook.

So a far-reaching improvement in situation can only be hoped for from a change in the overall attitude towards world affairs.

It was certainly not to be expected in the wake of Brezhnev's good intentions by Mr Brezhnev and his colleagues in the Politburo.

## SPACE RESEARCH

# Unlocking the secrets of number R 136a

by Hans-Jörg Fahr

R 136a is a sun in the Doradus nebula, part of the Magellanic Cloud, near our own, and its mass is 2,000 times greater than that of our Sun.

It has been confirmed by satellite observation via the International Ultraviolet Explorer satellite.

The Sun has long been known to be special in terms of the wide range of astrophysical possibilities. In terms of surface temperature and the light it emits, the Sun is very much a run-of-the-mill star.

There are much brighter, hotter stars with much more mass to show for themselves. But theoreticians specialising in stars are formed say there must be a limit to the size even of superstars, belie the gloomy forecasts of what is ahead for them in Asia and elsewhere.

Good of their peoples.

exceptional cases there might be stars that were 100 times larger, they would definitely be the exception.

One explanation is that most stars are much smaller than our Sun. Very few are much smaller than our Sun.

But, stars with a high mass count up their nuclear fuel much faster than ours, so they tend to be extremely short-lived.

They not only come into being less frequently, they also die faster. So well established is this assumption that the idea of a stellar object 2,000 or more times our size is both surprising and universal among astronomers.

discovery is the result of a theoretical probe of the 30 Doradus gas nebula, also known as the Tarantula Nebula in the Magellanic Cloud.

The nebula is an extensive area of ionised hydrogen, and the ionisation is the work of high-intensity radiation from within the nebula.

It must be assumed that it contains an energy source about 100 times as powerful than that of the hottest stars in the spectral class O.

The search for the source of this radiation hit some time ago on an unusual object in the centre of the nebula, an object that was named R 136a.

Investigation led German astronomers such as Johannes Feltzinger, Hart Schlotter, Theodor Schmidt, and Christoph Winkler of the astronomy department at Bochum University to conclude that R 136a must be a star with an enormous mass.

It was felt to account for the ionised radiation produced by the Doradus nebula.

The Bochum astronomers were in their article for *Astronomy and Astrophysics* to provide a clear picture to the mass of this stellar object.

New facts have been brought to light by the high-resolving spectral observations undertaken by the International Ultraviolet Explorer satellite.

They are outlined by three Wisconsin

University astrophysicists in *Science* and provide extremely interesting information on previously unknown properties of R 136a.

They base on spectral analysis the conclusion that the temperature on the surface of R 136a is a hitherto unsurpassed 63,000 degrees Kelvin, or roughly 63,273 centigrade.

The surface temperature of our Sun is a mere 6,000 degrees Kelvin.

In connection with the visual brightness observed by the Bochum astronomers, R 136a must be 100 million times brighter than the Sun.

It is hardly surprising that this star accounts for virtually all the light emitted by the entire nebula.

Other properties have been identified from analysis of the profile of a number of absorption lines in the star's spectrum that are caused by ionised carbon, nitrogen and helium.

They clearly indicate the existence of extremely powerful stellar winds. The outer shell of R 136a's matter is blown into the surroundings at speeds of up to 3,500 kilometres per second.

As a result the object loses mass at a rate corresponding to the mass of an entire Sun every 1,000 years.

Such intensive stellar winds are only known to exist on the surface of extremely hot stars in the O3 category. But stars in this category reach only 52,000 degrees Kelvin, or much less than R 136a.

Besides, at least 30 to 40 of them would need to be assembled in a small area if they were to account for the overall brilliance of R 136a.

So the only acceptable explanation is that R 136a is a single stellar object with extremely marked properties.

One must then assume that on its surface acceleration of gravity and radiation pressure cancel each other out.

It would follow that R 136a has a mass 2,000 times that of the Sun. Experts on the origin of heavenly bodies will have difficulty in accounting for its existence.

Hans-Jörg Fahr (Frankfurter Rundschau, 21 November 1981)



## Preparing for the lift off

Ulf Marbold (left), German candidate for one of the astronaut places in the European space lab to be launched in 1983, goes through his paces in a simulator at Mainz University. His colleagues are Americans. (Photo: dpa)

# European scientists plan probe to Mars

The European Space Agency plans to send a space probe to Mars, possibly in 1988 or 1990.

A feasibility study to examine technical problems has been commissioned. It will be carried out by Belgian, French, British, Italian and German scientists headed by Professor Ulf von Zahn of Bonn University.

In 1978, Professor von Zahn became the first non-American to contribute an experiment to an American interplanetary mission.

His device for probing the chemical make-up of the upper atmosphere of Venus supplies findings that were regarded as sensational.

They certainly did not tally with previous theories on the origin of the solar system and were typical of the problems Venus presents in connection with the history of the solar system.

The upper atmosphere of Venus was found to contain an unexpectedly high count of Argon 36, a rare gas that is known to be primordial and to date back to the early days of the solar system.

Its relative concentration in the atmosphere of Venus is markedly higher than in our own. Yet its frequency had been felt to depend largely on temperature.

Closer to the Sun (as Venus is in relation to Earth) less gas, or so it was felt, was likely to collect from the initial cloud of gas and dust that gave birth to a planet. So Venus ought to have less of this gas in its atmosphere than either Earth or still further away, from the Sun, Mars.

The Pioneer mission to Venus would, it was hoped, help scientists to sort out the lists to sort out the

More found its way into the early atmosphere of Venus than into that of Earth, which was further away from the Sun.

This inference has been borne out by measurements in the Martian atmosphere, which contains an even lower count of these three rare gases than our own.

Planetary research scientists are more and more convinced Mars will hold the

chaff among theories on the origin of the solar system.

But the readings taken by Professor von Zahn's device indicated that the truth was altogether different from current assumptions.

Von Zahn himself would not like too much importance to be attached to the findings. They might just be a red piece in a jigsaw puzzle that was mainly blue-green in colour. They need not rule out all previous theories.

There would not be any clear indication of a need to rewrite the early history of the solar system until more red pieces were found.

Besides, there were already various competing versions as to the origins of the planetary system of which we formed a part.

A conference on Venus research held in Palo Alto, near San Francisco, has shed more light on the subject.

US experiments on board the Venus probe showed oxygen and xenon counts were likewise higher than in the Earth's atmosphere.

Dr Thomas Donahue of the University of Michigan said the ratio of these three gases on Venus had much more in common with the ratio in the Sun's atmosphere than it did with their relative concentration in the Earth's atmosphere.


He infers that they were blown across from the Sun in an early stage of development when solar wind was at times much stronger than it is today.

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This inference has been borne out by measurements in the Martian atmosphere, which contains an even lower count of these three rare gases than our own.

Planetary research scientists are more and more convinced Mars will hold the

Continued on page 10



## An eye on the sky

This computerized 3.6 metre telescope is one of 10 at the European Southern Observatory site at La Silla in Chile. Work at the observatory is processed at an electronic centre in Munich. (Photo: ESO) wheat from the







*Gisela Schütte*  
(Die Welt, 20 November 1981)



## ■ BEHAVIOUR

## Youth thumbs nose at big stick of authority

Young Germans are no longer prepared blindly to accept authority, according to a study.

This is surprising in view of a study published a year ago, according to which there is a considerable neo-fascist potential among the 12 to 18-year-olds.

Yet the latest study coincides with the findings of a major survey by Gerda Lederer of New York who concludes that the change of attitude in the Federal Republic of Germany is more pronounced than in the USA: democratic and anti-authoritarian ideas are more deep-rooted among German high school students than among Americans.

Comparisons with a study in 1945, the Donald McGranahan Study, show that Germany's youth 35 years ago accepted authority much more readily than its opposite number in America.

But this does not mean that young Americans are now submissive in the face of authority and less democracy conscious.

The reason for the change, Mrs Lederer says, is that the endorsement of democratic and anti-authoritarian values has risen only slightly among America's young while the rise in Germany over the past 35 years has been dramatic.

The trend analysis for America was based on the McGranahan Study a survey carried out by a Turkish psychologist on the authoritarian way of thinking among Turkish and American juveniles as well as the Lederer Study.

The German survey was also based on the 1945 data of the McGranahan Study plus an opinion survey made by the Emnid Institute in 1963 and the findings of Gerda Lederer.

Mrs Lederer, an American born in Vienna, was prompted to carry out her study by her experience as a guest teacher at a Hamburg high school. The survey, which was funded by the Scientific Research Association is soon to be published in book form by Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen.

Mrs Lederer found German secondary school students as being much freer, more casual and more undisciplined than Americans.

But the real surprise, Gerda Lederer writes in the magazine *Psychologie heute* (10/81), turned out to be the teachers. Though they do not welcome the attitudes of their students, they accept and tolerate them in a non-authoritarian way.

Another reason for the study was the general scepticism in the USA. Nobody was prepared to believe her impressions.

There has been a basic change in fundamental values and attitudes in the Federal Republic of Germany, says Mrs Lederer. This change has largely gone unnoticed in the United States and is therefore not taken into account when it comes to presenting a realistic picture of Germany.

The German survey involved 925 juveniles in various types of secondary and vocational schools. The American high school students whom Mrs Lederer interviewed in 1978 were mostly from California, Tennessee and New York. But the survey is representative because it involved youngsters from all social backgrounds in both countries, different types of school and different geographic regions.



The American and German juveniles were given identical questionnaires; preliminary tests were carried out to ensure that there were no differences of nuances in the questions.

The questions themselves dealt with various types of authority such as state, school and society.

Surveys of this kind always run the risk of producing the answers considered desirable.

To find out whether the juveniles actually conveyed their own views and not what parents, school and the media uphold as virtues, the questionnaires contained specific "control questions".

Their evaluation showed that the youngsters actually voiced their own convictions.

Many of them added their own comments or refused to answer certain questions.

All this has been carefully recorded and analysed.

A German company has officially begun an informer system to reveal alcoholics on the staff.

The aim of the scheme is to get to the problem and help before it is too late.

The Voith firm in Heidenheim has issued a pamphlet which outlines some symptoms of alcoholism and says: "The desire to help has nothing to do with informing on a fellow staff member."

It warns against reluctance to say anything out of sympathy for the drinker.

Ninety per cent of adult Germans drink moderately to regularly and only five per cent are teetotal; another five per cent are alcoholics, says Herbert Ziegler, director of the German Anti-Addiction Society.

There are an estimated 1.8m alcoholics in this country. Their social decline usually begins at work when they receive the first warning.

But the threat of dismissal is as questionable a remedy as the prescription of castor oil for a cough. All that happens is that the patient does not dare cough for a while... but then he starts up again with a vengeance.

Dismissal often follows the second warning, and so begins the decline of the alcoholic despite all well-meant advice and admonishment at work.

Voith has for the past five years been trying to break this vicious circle. The warning against excessive consumption always goes hand in hand with an offer of concrete help.

The person concerned can talk it out with specially selected staff members who provide counselling on an honorary basis. These counsellors are supported by the entire staff - ranging from works council to management.

But even in Heidenheim the alcoholic is made to realise the fact that he is sick and that only treatment as an out-patient can help.

When a department head at Voith feels that one of his staff members

The conclusion:

Questions that were regarded as being stupid and pointless were treated accordingly by Germany's young. This included the question: "Do you think that the Germans as a whole are (a) better than; (b) about the same; as; (c) worse than the following nationalities?" (There followed a list of ten nationalities).

About 12 per cent of the Americans refused to answer these and similar questions. Among the Germans, 21 per cent did not answer these questions or wrote in comments like "all people are equal" or "there is no such thing as Germans and Italians" or simply "cliché".

Such attitudes naturally have to do with the degree to which a person is susceptible to authoritarianism and un-

democratic tendencies. The less authoritarian a test person the more free such critical comments or refusals to answer.

Renate J. Mesner

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 14 November 1981)



## Listening on the grape vine

A publican in the Bavarian town of Stephanskirchen, Rosenheim, wanted a telephone box with flair: so he simply put a wine cask. Now his customers can hear the world. The girl is just a lifeline to the outside world.

He wrote in comments like "all people are equal" or "there is no such thing as Germans and Italians" or simply "cliché".

Such attitudes naturally have to do with the degree to which a person is susceptible to authoritarianism and un-

## Staff told to inform on 'drinkers'

depends on alcohol he first has a man-to-man talk with him. If he considers it necessary, he can ask one of the honorary counsellors to attend the discussion.

The employee need not fear dismissal. This type of chat entails no job consequences.

But should he continue drinking excessively, the first talk is followed by an "extended discussion", attended by a member of the personnel department and of the works council in addition to the department head and counsellor.

Depending on the outcome of this, the personnel department and the counselling service prepare a specific offer of help.

This can range from outpatient counselling or medical treatment all the way to an all-out drying-out cure.

The employee has eight weeks in which to make up his mind. Should he again overindulge, the department head tells after getting the personnel officer and works council approval, issues another warning, again together with the offer of help.

Only after the second warning must the employee with a drinking problem accept the offer of help or face dismissal.

If he accepts help and if there is no relapse there will also be no disciplinary consequences.

Gisela Langensee, who planned and developed the Heidenheim model, says that while there have been no great successes there has nevertheless been progress in the form of small steps.

The main problem is for the drinker

to recognise his affliction in good time. To start with, every alcoholic is a run-of-the-mill consumer of liquor. He is usually particularly popular in company.

Herr Ziegler stresses that alcoholics are frequently "conspicuously inebriated". But they are always there: there is a party in progress; and they do become conspicuous when they cure themselves of excessive drinking mostly unsuccessfully.

The Voith brochure lists a number of symptoms marking the beginning of alcoholism, among them: heavy drinking at parties; the need for alcohol in the early morning hours; trembling, sweating, restlessness when there is nothing to drink; frequent leaving of the place (mostly at regular intervals); punctuality; diminishing performance towards the end of the work day; frequent absenteeism on days before and after the weekend; and the steady increase of excessive consumption or drinking when the subject is mentioned.

The pamphlet stresses, however, that this only applies if these symptoms have been observed over a long period of time and if the same symptoms may mean different things in some cases.

The brochure warns fellow-workers against being reluctant to mention symptoms out of sympathy for the person concerned.

As one ex-alcoholic puts it: "When I was in the pants, I was a kick in the pants."

Ziegler stresses the problems alcoholics have in switching from one phase group (alcoholics) to another (teetotalers). The fact is that teetotalers meet with as much animosity as alcoholics.

And in a company this can go as far as to prompt some people to put alcohol into an ex-alcoholic's juice.

Angela J. Mesner

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 14 November 1981)

## SOCIETY

## Tommy Atkins's bit of Germany remains forever England

thousand British soldiers and are based in the Federal Republic of Germany and the British sector of Berlin. There are 76,000 dependents. How do they get on with the Germans? What is life like in the BAOR and RAF?

barracks in Gremmendorf, Münster, are mostly old red-brick buildings. The long corridor on the second floor is typical of unmarried men's quarters. There is an air of institutional

the tall wooden doors on both sides. The walls are whitewashed. At the end of the corridor there are niches that look like lockers or stands for billiard cues.

ago they were lined with lockers for officers' rifles. Now the British servicemen in Germany are virtually identical. Pin-ups on the walls, in corners by the door, which are separated by small

Anderson sits in his cage. The TV is in one corner. A squaddie wearing a beret is absorbed in rock music. He is asleep and looks even younger than he does in denim.

Anderson, 19, is a typical British soldier. He joined the army at 17 and is posted to Germany at 17 and is his official role is to deter the enemy from attacking the

one of 55,000 men based in the Rhine Army or RAF. They are stationed in North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony and Berlin.

There are 76,000 dependents: wives, children. And 28,000 support staff in civilian jobs.

BAOR is an army based in a foreign country that cost the British taxpayer more than £1.2bn in the 1979/80 financial year alone.

Anderson as a single man is in a barracks. 60 per cent of BAOR men are married. His working day runs in accordance with military routine.

He is at 6.30, breakfast at 6.45, place (mostly at regular intervals); punctuality; diminishing performance towards the end of the work day; frequent absenteeism on days before and after the weekend; and the steady increase of excessive consumption or drinking when the subject is mentioned.

The pamphlet stresses, however, that this only applies if these symptoms have been observed over a long period of time and if the same symptoms may mean different things in some cases.

The brochure warns fellow-workers against being reluctant to mention symptoms out of sympathy for the person concerned.

As one ex-alcoholic puts it: "When I was in the pants, I was a kick in the pants."

Ziegler stresses the problems alcoholics have in switching from one phase group (alcoholics) to another (teetotalers). The fact is that teetotalers meet with as much animosity as alcoholics.

And in a company this can go as far as to prompt some people to put alcohol into an ex-alcoholic's juice.

Angela J. Mesner

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 14 November 1981)

he is a combination of military discipline at work and personal responsibility at home. It includes lessons that he must learn enough to learn back home.

Anderson, 19, is a typical British soldier. He joined the army at 17 and is posted to Germany at 17 and is his official role is to deter the enemy from attacking the

among friends and in a familiar environment.

In Germany he is very much on his own in a foreign country. Many of his teenage counterparts learn the little they know about Germany from loitering near the railway station to kill time.

For the married men, or pads, as they are known, life after hours means going home to the family. It is obviously a different matter altogether.

Basil Barden has served 35 years in the army. He is a sergeant-major and an old hand. He knows most of the regimental postings from past experience.

As a raw recruit he once lived as a lodger with a German family in a previous garrison town. He has been with the second-largest regiment in the BAOR, in Münster, since 1975.

As a married man he is no longer a lodger; he has married quarters, a pad of his own. He pays DM200 a month in rent.

BAOR married quarters consist of about 28,000 permanent houses and apartments and 2,000 rented quarters. Most were built to British specifications.

Matthew Warnock, 23, broke out of this BAOR ghetto by chance, as it were. He got to know a local girl, they fell in love and married on 7 September 1979.

The BAOR proudly claims that 10 per cent of its men are married to German wives. It is an impressive figure, but marriage, even a mixed marriage, does not end the problems that are encountered.

Officials are well aware that the language barrier is the most serious handicap that prevents British and Germans from getting to know each other better.

Before being posted to Germany, servicemen are put through a two-month crash course to learn the basics about Germany, the Germans and their language.

Basic German is also taught compulsorily when they first arrive in Germany. Any further language courses are voluntary.

Small wonder that British servicemen prefer to keep to themselves, drinking the beer they drink back home, speaking English, their native language.

They seldom go out of camp for a drink or to the disco. When they do so

they usually go out in groups; it makes them feel more sure of themselves. After a few beers they often feel too sure of themselves and get mixed up in a bar brawl after stirring up old arguments with and about the Krauts, as they call the Germans.

"It's because of the way the army runs things," says the Coldstream Guards, part of Britain's Rhineland force in Germany.

BAOR provides everything the servicemen and their families need.

At Rheindahlen, the BAOR GHQ near Mönchengladbach, British servicemen and their families live in entire suburbs of their own.

In Münster there are 5,000 British servicemen, 4,800 dependents and 300 attached personnel. The BAOR runs nine barracks, eight kindergartens, five primary schools, a senior school, five youth clubs, four churches, a cinema, three bookshops, four Naafi stores and a British military hospital.

Then there are the messes and unit bars in every barracks, the women's clubs, the sports clubs. There is the BFBS with TV and radio round the clock.

"When I need to buy clothes for the family I don't go to German shops," says Ann Barden. "I buy by mail order from England just like everyone else."

So it is equally unsurprising that British servicemen can be recognised by the cut of their clothes and not just by their haircuts and general bearing.

Despite the difficulties most British servicemen seem happy with life in Germany. "Would I like to go back home? Not likely. Not at the moment anyhow," most would say.

They feel the quality of life is better over here. Everything is organised. The streets are cleaner. People are more disciplined.

Why, they tend their gardens beautifully, they sweep the pavement in front of their homes regularly in summer and clear the snow with equal regularity in winter.



Bonn President Karl Carstens takes the salute during a visit to the Coldstream Guards, part of Britain's Rhineland force in Germany. (Photo: dpa)

Arguments like these are usually advanced when BAOR personnel are asked why life in Germany is better than back home in Blighty.

"With the Germans everything is either black or white," says Sgt-Major Barden. "There is no grey zone in between like we have back home."

This is a mentality the military man is bound to admire.

Since 1979 school-leavers have queued outside the Army recruiting offices in Britain. Times have changed since the days when a career in the forces was the last way out for those who stood no chance of making the grade in civvy street.

But unemployment, especially juvenile unemployment, has increased so alarmingly that more and more youngsters, especially school-leavers, are opting for a safe job in the armed forces.

"Most new recruits," says Sgt-Major Barden, "come to Germany just for the good life. They have long forgotten our basic military role."

The good life, as he sees it (Sgt-Major Barden is in charge of a 90-man squadron), includes not only higher pay than back home but also a host of other privileges.

Petrol, drink and tobacco cost half the British price. There is six weeks' home leave per year, including a free flight and six free British Rail warrants to anywhere in the UK.

"The best saving of all is to buy yourself a duty-free car," says Warnock.

"The standard of young recruits has declined in recent years," Barden is convinced, although all BAOR regiments are now back to full strength and there is no lack of volunteers.

"But discipline and trouble with drink are getting worse and worse," says Warnock, who works in a military prison.

Servicemen always have the end of their three-year posting in their mind's eye and are often simply not interested in integrating with the Germans.

"The army is getting more and more like a kindergarten," says Anderson. Yet all are agreed that they would not, under any circumstances, want to become German. They are proud of being British.

Very few servicemen stay on in Germany when they leave the forces. "It is extremely difficult to get the two most arrogant nations in Europe together," one British officer says.

That, at any rate, is how he accounts for the strangely sheltered, ghetto-like lives British servicemen lead in Germany.

Christian Langer

(Vorwärts, 12 November 1981)

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